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Laboratory experimentWe present the results of the ﬁrst experimental study of ﬁnancial markets contagion. We develop a
model of ﬁnancial contagion amenable to be tested in the laboratory. In the model, contagion happens
because of cross-market rebalancing, a channel for transmission of shocks across markets ﬁrst studied
by Kodres and Pritsker (2002). Theory predicts that, because of portfolio rebalancing, a negative shock
in one market transmits itself to the others, as investors adjust their portfolio allocations. The theory
is supported by the experimental results. The price observed in the laboratory is close to that predicted
by theory, and strong contagion effects are observed. The results are robust across different market struc-
tures. Moreover, as theory predicts, lower asymmetric information in a (‘‘developed’’) ﬁnancial market
increases the contagion effects in (‘‘emerging’’) markets.
 2013 Published by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction
Financial crises in one country often spread to other, unrelated
economies, a phenomenon known as ﬁnancial contagion. Given the
pervasiveness of the phenomenon in recent years, a lot of
theoretical and empirical work has been devoted to its
understanding.
The theoretical literature on contagion in ﬁnancial markets has
identiﬁed several channels of contagion.1 In King and Wadhwani
(1990), informational spillovers lead traders to trade in one market
on the basis of the information they infer from price changes in an-
other. Informational spillovers are also present in Cipriani and Gua-
rino (2008), in which contagion occurs because trading activity in
one market creates an informational cascade in another. In Calvo
(1999), correlated liquidity shocks – which occur when agents, hit
by a liquidity shock in one market, need to liquidate their position
across markets in order to meet a margin call – generate contagion
across markets (see also Yuan, 2005). In Kyle and Xiong (2001),
ﬁnancial contagion is due to wealth effects. In Fostel and Geanakop-los (2008) ﬁnancial contagion arises as a result of the interplay be-
tween market incompleteness, agents’ heterogeneity and margin
requirements. In Kodres and Pritsker (2002), contagion happens
through cross-market rebalancing, when traders hit by a shock in
one market need to rebalance their portfolios of assets. Consider
an economy with three markets: A, B and C; assume that A and B
share exposure to one macroeconomic risk factor, whereas B and C
share exposure to a different macroeconomic factor. A shock in mar-
ket A may prompt investors to rebalance their portfolios in market B
(because of their common risk exposure), which in turns prompts
investors to rebalance their portfolios in C. As a result, the shock
transmits itself from A to C, although the two markets do not share
exposure to the same risk factor (i.e., their fundamentals are
independent).
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the cross-market rebal-
ancing channel of contagion in a laboratory. We do so in order to
understand whether rebalancing motives are not only theoretically
interesting, but also able to generate contagion effects with human
subjects.
Kodres and Pritsker (2002) study cross-market rebalancing in a
rational expectations, CARA-Normal model. Their model builds on
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), extending it to a multi-asset econ-
omy. To implement their model in the laboratory would be difﬁ-
cult, given that agents are assumed to have a CARA utility
M. Cipriani et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 4310–4326 4311function, the asset values are distributed according to normal dis-
tributions, and there are three types of traders.
Instead of trying to design the experiment to replicate Kodres
and Pritsker (2002) literally, we used a different strategy. We con-
structed a model that still requires agents to rebalance their port-
folios, but in a much simpler set-up that subjects could easily
understand. We implemented the model in the laboratory with
three treatments. In the ﬁrst two treatments,which we label the
‘‘baseline treatments’’, subjects trade three assets with an automa-
ton representing a fringe of uninformed traders. The assets’ funda-
mental values are independent of each other. Portfolio rebalancing
motives arise because subjects’ payoffs depend not only on the re-
turn to their investment, but also on the composition of their port-
folios. Optimal portfolio weights are exogenously imposed by the
experimenters to create meaningful contagion effects. In the third
treatment, we studied the rebalancing channel with a different
market mechanism. In particular, subjects with the same payoff
function as in the previous treatments traded in a multi-unit dou-
ble auction market. They exchanged the assets among themselves,
some of them being informed traders and others being uninformed
traders.
The results from our experiment are very encouraging for the
theoretical analysis. In all the three treatments, the prices that
we observe in the laboratory are very close to the equilibrium ones.
As a result, very strong contagion effects are observed between the
two periphery markets. Therefore, the experimental analysis lends
credibility to the idea that the rebalancing channel is an important
element in creating cross-market contagion.
An important implication of the Kodres and Pritsker (2002)mod-
el is that thedegreeof asymmetric information ina (developedecon-
omy’s) ﬁnancial center affects the severity of contagion effects
across emerging markets. Lower asymmetric information, by mak-
ing the price less elastic, decreases the costs of rebalancing; as a re-
sult, the transmission of shocks from one periphery market to the
other ismore pronounced. Therefore, asmarkets in developed econ-
omies become more transparent (i.e., as the degree of asymmetric
information decreases), contagion effects among emergingmarkets
becomestronger.We tested this prediction in the laboratory, by run-
ning treatments with different price elasticities in the ﬁnancial cen-
ter. The experimental results support the theory: as the price in the
ﬁnancial center becomes less elastic, contagion effects in the periph-
ery become more pronounced.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the
theoretical framework and its predictions. Section 3 presents the
experiment. Section 4 illustrates the results. Section 5 concludes.
TheAppendix contains the instructionsandsomerobustness checks.2 Intuitively, noise traders interpret the order ﬂow in market B (e.g., a high
demand) as having informational content. As a result, they respond more to changes
in the order ﬂow (because it affects their conditional expectation of the asset value).
3 We preferred to have markets open sequentially rather than simulatenously, so
that subjects in the experiment could concentrate on one market at a time. One
concern one can have with the sequential structure is that it requires solving a
backward induction problem, making the game perhaps more complicated. We will
comment more on this when discussing our results.2. The theoretical framework
2.1. The portfolio rebalancing channel
Our experiment, inspired by the work of Kodres and Pritsker
(2002), aims to test experimentally the ‘‘cross-market rebalancing’’
channel of ﬁnancial contagion. In Kodres and Pritsker (2002), be-
cause traders need to rebalance their portfolios, contagion arises
even when traditional channels of contagion (such as correlated
information, correlated liquidity shocks or wealth effects) are ab-
sent. We give the intuition behind their result through a simple
example (taken from Kodres and Pritsker, 2002).
There are three assets traded in the economy, A, B and C, whose
liquidation values take the form
VA ¼ hA þ bAf1 þ gA
VB ¼ bB;1f1 þ bB;2f2
VC ¼ hC þ bCf2 þ gCwhere f1 and f2 represent shared macroeconomic risk factors; bA,bB
and bC are the risk factors’ marginal effects on the assets; hA and hC
represent country-speciﬁc private information; and gA and gC coun-
try-speciﬁc risk factors (on which private information is not avail-
able). All the random variables are independently distributed.
Note that countries A and C (which Kodres and Pritsker inter-
pret as emerging, periphery economies) share no common macro-
economic factor; moreover, they are not linked by either correlated
information, or by correlated liquidity shocks. Nevertheless, one
can show that investors’ need to adjust their portfolios leads to
shocks transmitting themselves from one periphery market to
the other. This happens because, although A and C share no risk
factors, they are both linked to B (which Kodres and Pritsker inter-
pret as a developed ﬁnancial market), and B acts as a conduit for
shock transmission.
Suppose that informed traders receive information that makes
them decrease their expected value in market A; that is, there is
a negative information shock in market A. Their optimal response
is to sell asset A, thus lowering their exposure to risk factor f1 be-
low its optimal level. Optimal portfolio considerations will lead
them to increase their exposure to f1 by buying asset B, thus raising
its price. This, however, increases their exposure to risk factor f2
above its optimal level, thus leading them to sell asset C. As a re-
sult, the price in market C will drop. Therefore, a negative shock
in market A leads to an increase in the price of asset B (the ﬁnancial
center) and to a decrease in the price of asset C (the other periph-
ery economy).
Note that informational asymmetry in market B plays a crucial
role in the transmission of the shock. If there is more informational
asymmetry in B, its price increases by more with the order ﬂow
and cross market rebalancing becomes more expensive.2 Because
of this, there will be less rebalancing from A to B and from B to C. This
reduces market C sensitivity to shocks in market A, that is, the sever-
ity of contagion. In contrast, a decrease in informational asymmetry
in market B makes contagion more severe. Kodres and Pritsker
(2002) comment that ‘‘steps that reduce information asymmetries
in developed markets may have the unintended consequence of
enhancing developed market’s role as a conduit for contagion among
emerging markets’’.
As we mentioned in the Introduction, Kodres and Pritsker
(2002) use a rational expectations, CARA-Normal model (which ex-
tends Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) with three types of traders. Be-
cause implementing their model in the laboratory would be
difﬁcult, we developed a simple model, which captures the same
intuition, but is amenable to experimental testing. We describe
this model in the following section.2.2. The model structure
We present a simple model of portfolio rebalancing that can be
easily brought to the laboratory. In our model, there are three mar-
kets – labeled, as above, A, B and C – where traders trade three as-
sets denoted by the same letters. The three markets open
sequentially. First traders receive information about the funda-
mental value in market A and adjust their position accordingly.
Then, they adjust their portfolio by trading ﬁrst in market B and
afterwards in market C.3
5 That is, although this is not in the model, one can interpret the elasticity of their
net supply as reﬂecting their belief that the order ﬂow come either from informed
traders or from noise traders (who trade purely for liquidity reasons). A similar
interpretation can be found in Kodres and Pritsker (2002).
6 Note that this is almost the same price schedule that appears in the standard
Cournot oligopoly model. In a Cournot model, however, the price schedule for a ﬁrm
depends on the consumer’s demand; here, instead,
PN
i¼1x
J
i refers to the net-demand
by the informed traders themselves (which is equivalent to the uninformed traders
net-supply).
7 Note that, although in the model the asset values equal 0, 50 and 100 with equal
probabilities, in the experiment we only considered these speciﬁc realizations. This is
not a problem since subjects in the experiment played the role of informed traders
who knew the asset values and uninformed traders were played by an automaton.
Moreover, we decided to run the experiment with the value of asset A alternating
between 0 and 100 (although the idea of contagion typically refers to crises more than
to booms) because we though it would make the experiment more interesting and
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can be 0, 50, or 100, with equal probabilities. There are two types of
traders in the market: informed and uninformed traders. Both
types of traders trade in all the three markets. Let us discuss in-
formed traders ﬁrst. There are N informed traders, who receive a
perfectly informative signal about the values of the three assets.
Each informed trader chooses the quantities xAi ; x
B
i and x
C
i to max-
imize the following payoff function:
ðVA  pAÞxAi þ ðVB  pBÞxBi þ ðVC  pCÞxCi  xAi þ xBi  F1
 2
 xBi þ xCi  F2
 2
; ð1Þ
where xJi is the quantity (number of shares) of asset J bought
xJi > 0
 
or sold xJi < 0
 
by informed trader i, and pJ is the price
of asset J. Observe that the payoff function is made up of two parts.
The ﬁrst three terms (which we call Trading Proﬁt) represent the
gain made by trader i when buying or selling an asset (i.e., the dif-
ference between the asset fundamental value and its price, times
the quantity purchased or sold). The last two terms (which we call
Portfolio Imbalance Penalty)  xAi þ xBi  F1
 2  xBi þ xCi  F2
 2 
represent the penalty for holding an ‘‘unbalanced’’ portfolio. Note
that F1 is the optimal exposure to a common risk factor to assets
A and B, and F2 the optimal exposure to a common risk factor to as-
sets B and C. The term xAi þ xBi  F1
 2 penalizes investors for exces-
sive (or too little) exposure to the risk factor common to A and B,
whereas xBi þ xCi  F2
 2 penalizes investors for excessive (or too lit-
tle) exposure to the risk factor common to B and C.
The Portfolio Imbalance Penalty is a reduced form way of adding
portfolio balance considerations in the informed traders’ payoff
function.4 It introduces the same type of optimal portfolio concerns
that triggers contagion in the Kodres and Pritsker (2002) model out-
lined above; as a result, traders’ optimal demand does not depend
only on the expected value of an asset, but also on the optimal expo-
sure to different risk factors. Because of this, informed traders have
an incentive to rebalance between A and B, and between B and C
in the same way as in Kodres and Pritsker (2002). At the same time,
with this setup subjects in the laboratory do not have to solve a com-
plex optimal portfolio problem.
As we shall see, informed traders have both informational and
non informational reasons to trade. Informational reasons play a
role in market A, where informed traders (who know asset A’s true
value) can earn a proﬁt by buying the asset at a price which is be-
low (above) its fundamental value. Non-informational reasons play
out in market B and C, when traders buy or sell the assets in order
to minimize rebalancing costs.
Let us now discuss uninformed traders. Uninformed traders
trade for unmodelled, liquidity reasons. Their aggregate net-supply
schedule is price elastic, and given by
KJ½pJ  EðVJÞ;
where VJ (J = A,B,C) is the asset value, pJ is the asset price, and KJ is a
positive parameter. E(VJ) represents the asset’s unconditional ex-
pected value, which is equal to 50 in the three markets. The above
expression implies that uninformed traders supply the asset when-
ever its price is above its expected fundamental value and demand
it whenever it is below. The parameter KJ measures how elastic the
uninformed traders’ net supply function is to changes in the price.
The higher KJ, the more the net supply responds to changes in the
price of asset J.
One reason why uninformed trader’s net supply is price sensi-
tive is (unmodelled) asymmetric information in the markets. This4 We thank Laura Kodres for suggesting this implementation strategy.interpretation is particularly relevant because in Kodres and Prits-
ker (2002) the degree of asymmetric information determines the
severity of contagion. In particular, if asymmetric information be-
tween informed and uninformed traders is severe, uninformed
traders interpret the order ﬂow in the market (e.g., a higher price)
as having informational content.5 As a result, they respond more to
changes in the asset price (because it affects their conditional expec-
tation on the asset value), and the net-supply function will be more
elastic. As we shall see, this makes contagion less pronounced.
In each market J, in equilibrium, net supply from uninformed
traders equals net demand from informed traders whenever
KJðpJ  EðVJÞÞ ¼
XN
i¼1
xJi :
This means that in each market J the price schedule that in-
formed traders face is
pJ ¼ EðVJÞ þ 1
KJ
XN
i¼1
xJi : ð2Þ
In particular, if the net demand from informed traders is positive
PN
i¼1x
J
i > 0
 
, the price is greater than the asset unconditional ex-
pected value. If it is negative, the price is, instead, lower.62.3. Laboratory implementation
We brought our model to the laboratory with three different
treatments. The main difference among them is the market struc-
ture that we implemented in the laboratory. In the ﬁrst two treat-
ments, subjects played the role of informed traders trading against
an automaton; subjects chose their quantities demanded in a game
akin to a Cournot game. This setup had the great advantage of
being simple and easy for subjects to understand. In the third treat-
ment, instead, we used a market mechanism closer to how trading
occurs in actual ﬁnancial markets; speciﬁcally, subjects played
both the roles of informed and uniformed traders, and exchanged
the assets among themselves through a multi-unit double auction.
Let us start by describing the implementation of the ﬁrst two
treatments. Ten subjects acted as informed traders (N = 10). Mar-
kets opened sequentially. An automaton took the other side of
the market, representing a fringe of uninformed traders. Subjects
were presented with the equilibrium price schedule (2), and each
submitted his net demand order. Traders were paid according to
the payoff function (1) with F1 ¼ F2 ¼ 0.
We ran the experiment for two sets of realization of the funda-
mentals: in odd rounds we set VA = 0, VB = 50, VC = 50; whereas in
even rounds we set VA = 100, VB = 50, VC = 50.7enjoyable for the subjects, thus lowering the chance of boredom effects in the
laboratory. Moroever, one could suspect that subjects would have a higher ability to
buy than to sell, a conjecture which, as we shall see, does not ﬁnd support in our data.
Table 1
Equilibrium predictions.
Market A Market B Market C
pA xAi
 
pB xBi
 
pC xCi
 
VA = 0, VB = 50, VC = 50
T1  T3 25.61(24.39) 62.81 (12.80) 41.74 (8.26)
T2 20.26 (29.74) 52.11 (21.09) 36.39 (13.61)
VA = 100, VB = 50, VC = 50
T1  T3 74.39 (24.39) 37.19 (12.80) 58.26 (8.26)
T2 79.74 (29.74) 47.89 (21.09) 63.61 (13.61)
The table shows the equilibrium prices and quantities traded in each market.
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Treatment 2 (T2), KJ was set equal to 10 in markets A and C, but
equal to 100 in market B. That is, in Treatment 1, the net-supply
function in all the three markets was
pJ ¼ 50þ 1
10
XN
i¼1
xJi ;
and in Treatment 2, it was the same but for market B, where it was
pB ¼ 50þ 1
100
XN
i¼1
xBi :
In words, the net-supply function in market Bwas more elastic than
in Treatment 1.
In Treatment 3 (T3), instead of having an exogenous net-supply
schedule, we had M = 10 subjects acting as informed traders. We
gave uninformed traders the following payoff function:
ðpA  50ÞqAi 
1
2
qAi
 2 þ ðpB  50ÞqBi 
1
2
qBi
 2 þ ðpC  50ÞqCi
 1
2
qCi
 2
;
where, for each market, the ﬁrst term is the subject’s expected prof-
it from trading the asset, and the second term is the quadratic cost
of holding a different position from the initial endowment of zero.8
Note that, in contrast to our notation for informed traders, qJi > 0
means that the uninformed trader is supplying the asset, whereas
qJi < 0 means that he is demanding it. An uninformed trader’s net-
supply schedule is, therefore, given by
qJi ¼ pJ  50:
By aggregating across the 10 uninformed traders, we obtain the
following aggregate net-supply function:
QJ ¼
XM
i¼1
qJi ¼ 10ðpJ  50Þ ¼ KJðpJ  EðVJÞÞ;
which is the same net-supply function that we had in Treatment 1.
Note that, in Treatment 3, similarly to the other two treatments,
informed traders valued asset A either 0 of 100 and assets B and C
always 50. In contrast to the previous treatments, however, the va-
lue was randomly determined at the beginning of each round, and
only informed traders were informed about it. This allowed us to
study whether private information was reﬂected by the price.
2.4. Equilibrium predictions
Given the sequential structure of the game, we ﬁnd the equilib-
rium by backward induction. We compute both the Cournot and
the competitive equilibrium. Given that in our laboratory imple-
mentation there are 10 informed traders, the two equilibria are ex-
tremely similar; therefore, in the rest of this section, we discuss the
Cournot equilibrium prices and quantities only. Table 1 shows the
quantity that each informed trader buys or sells in the three mar-
kets: the upper part of the table refers to VA = 0 and the lower one
to VA = 100.9 The ﬁrst row refers to Treatments 1 and 3, where
KJ = 10 in all three markets; whereas the second row refers to Treat-
ment 2, where KA = KC = 10 and KB = 100.
Let us ﬁrst consider Treatments 1 and 3. When VA = 0, informed
traders sell asset A and the equilibrium price (25.61) is lower than8 Note that giving subjects the above payoff function is tantamount to assuming
that, in the economy, uninformed traders value the assets 50 in all markets (e.g.,
because of private values).
9 Of course, the equilibrium quantities in the two cases only differ for the sign. A
negative sign means that the quantity is sold by an informed trader.the unconditional expected value (50). To rebalance their portfo-
lios, informed traders buy in market B and sell in market C. The
low realization of asset A’s value (which can be interpreted as a
negative shock in the market) transmits itself to market C. The
equilibrium price in market C is lower than the fundamental value
although the asset values in market A and C are independent. Sim-
ilarly, when VA = 100, informed traders buy asset A and the equilib-
rium price (74.39) is above the asset’s unconditional expected
value. For cross-market rebalancing reasons, traders sell in market
B and buy in market C; as a result, prices in markets A and C co-
move.
A low realization of the asset value in market A – i.e., VA = 0 –
pushes the price of the asset approximately 49% below its uncon-
ditional expected value. Because of portfolio rebalancing, the price
in market B exceeds the asset value by 26%, whereas the price of
asset C is 16% lower than the asset value.
In Treatment 2, since price elasticity in market B is lower, rebal-
ancing becomes less costly. For this reason, when VA = 100, in-
formed traders buy a higher number of asset A, and the
equilibrium price in this market (79.74) is higher than in Treat-
ments 1 and 3. The quantity sold in market B reaches approxi-
mately 21 units, while the price only moves from 50 to 47.89.
Given the high number of units sold in market B, informed traders
buy almost 14 units of asset C. The effect of the high realization of
the fundamental in market A on asset C is now signiﬁcantly higher
than before, with the price of asset C jumping to 63.61. The ﬁgures
for the case of VA = 0 are analogous. Traders sell asset A pushing the
price approximately 59% below the asset unconditional expected
value. The price in market B exceeds the asset value by only 4%,
whereas the price of asset C is 27% lower than the asset value.10
As we mentioned before, Treatment 2 is inspired by an impor-
tant observation by Kodres and Pritsker (2002). They interpret
markets A and C as emerging markets and market B as a developed
market. Moreover, they link the degree of price elasticity in a mar-
ket to the degree of asymmetric information. The presence of a
developed market with less asymmetric information (i.e., a lower
price elasticity) exacerbates the contagious effects of portfolio
rebalancing.
3. The experiment
We now describe the experimental procedures. As we men-
tioned above, in the ﬁrst two treatments subjects, acting as in-
formed traders, simply chose quantities to buy or sell to an
automaton in each market. In the third treatment, instead, ten sub-
jects acted as informed traders and ten as uninformed traders.
They exchanged the three assets among themselves in a multi-unit
double auction.
For each treatment we ran ﬁve sessions, recruiting a total of 200
subjects. The experiment was run at the ELSE laboratory at UCL in10 For comparison, when VA = 100, in Treatments 1 and 3, the competitive
equilibrium prices are pA = 76.19,pB = 35.714 and pC = 59.52; in Treatment 2, they
are pA = 82.17, pB = 47.674 and pC = 65.504.
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jects from the college undergraduate population across all disci-
plines. Subjects had no previous experience with this
experiment. The experiment was programmed and conducted with
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).13 The endowments of cash and assets had the only purpose of making the3.1. The baseline treatments
Each session of the baseline treatments consisted of 20 rounds
of trading. The experimental currency was called Lira, and was ex-
changed at the end of the experiment into British Pounds.
Let us explain the procedures for each round. At the beginning
of each session we distributed written instructions to the subjects
(see Appendix). We explained to subjects that they all received the
same instructions (in an attempt to make the game common
knowledge). Subjects could ask clarifying questions, which we an-
swered privately.
In each round, the ten participants traded in the three markets
(A, B and C), which opened sequentially. Subjects played as in-
formed traders, whereas the net supply from uninformed traders
was provided by an automaton. Before trading in each market, sub-
jects were provided with an endowment of 50 units of each asset
(in the instructions called ‘‘good’’) and of 15,000 liras.
Subjects were told that in the odd rounds of the experiment,
the value of asset A was set equal to 0, whereas in the even
rounds, it was set equal to 100 liras. Moreover, they were told
that in markets B and C the value of the asset was equal to
50.11 The payoff function described in Section 2 was carefully de-
scribed in the instructions. We explained it both analytically and
by presenting some numerical examples; we also provided subjects
with a table illustrating the price that would have occurred for
many combinations of the quantities bought (or sold) by the sub-
ject himself and the aggregate net demand of all other participants
(see the instructions in Appendix).
At the beginning of each round, subjects decided how many
units of asset A they wanted to sell (in odd rounds, when its value
was 0) or to buy (in even rounds, when its value was 100). They did
so by inputting a number between 0 and 50 on the screen. After all
10 subjects had made their trading decision for asset A, they ob-
served a screen reporting the individual decisions of all partici-
pants, the equilibrium price, and each subject’s own Trading
Proﬁt in market A (i.e., the difference between the fundamental va-
lue and the trading price times the quantity sold or purchased).
Furthermore, they were also informed of the (provisional) Portfolio
Imbalance Penalty that they would suffer for their trade in market A
(i.e., assuming no trade in the other markets).12
After trading in market A, subjects could trade in market B. They
had to decide how many units of the asset they wanted to buy or
sell. They did so by inputting a number between 0 and 50 and then
clicking on a ‘‘buy’’ or ‘‘sell’’ button. After they had all made their
decision, they observed a feedback screen reporting the individual
decisions, the equilibrium price, Trading Proﬁt in market B, and, ﬁ-
nally, the Portfolio Imbalance Penalties suffered because of the expo-
sures in markets A and B, and the (provisional) Portfolio Imbalance
Penalties suffered because of the exposures in markets B and C
(assuming no trade in market C).
The procedure for market C was identical. The round was con-
cluded with a summary feedback indicating the quantities bought11 As we mentioned above, this is slightly different from the model above, where the
three assets take values 0, 50, and 100 with equal probability. For the purposes of our
study, the difference is, however, immaterial.
12 That is, we told them the value of  xAi þ xBi
 2  xBi þ xCi
 2, given their choice of
xAi , and assuming that the choices of x
B
i and x
C
i were zero.or sold by the subject in each market, the resulting prices and prof-
its, the two penalties and the total payoff.
The total per-round payoff only depended on the sum of the
Trading Proﬁt in each market and on two Portfolio Imbalance Penal-
ties. The initial endowments of assets and liras that we gave to sub-
jects at the beginning of the round were taken back at the end.13
Moreover, we avoided that subjects ended with a negative payoff
by setting the payoff in each round to zero whenever it was negative
(subjects were explained of this in the instructions).14 It is easy to
verify that setting a negative payoff equal to zero does not change
subjects’ incentives (similarly to what happens in a standard Cour-
not game), and, as a result, the equilibrium predictions. This is true
because in equilibrium, agents’ payoffs are positive: as a result,
any agent will choose the same equilibrium proﬁt-maximizing quan-
tities independently on the off-equilibrium payoffs (as long as these
are lower than the equilibrium ones).15
After the 20th round, we summed up all the per-round payoffs
and we converted them into pounds. In addition, we gave subjects
a show-up fee of £5. Subjects were paid in private, immediately
after the experiment. On average, subjects earned £25 for a 1.5 h
experiment.3.2. The MUDA treatment
In the two baseline treatments, we tested the Kodres and
Pritsker’s (2002) rebalancing channel of contagion by designing
a very simple experimental game. Having an experimental setup
that would be easy for the subjects to understand was a key dri-
ver of our design choice for the ﬁrst two treatments. Neverthe-
less, one can wonder whether our results are robust to a
different trading mechanism which is closer to how trading
occurs in actual ﬁnancial markets, and, more importantly,
in which the net supply function is not generated by an
automaton.
To this purpose, in the third treatment, we used a different trad-
ing mechanism, a multi-unit double auction (MUDA). In a MUDA,
subjects trade in continuous time, posting buy and sell limit orders
for multiple units. Orders are automatically matched by a com-
puter, in a similar fashion to what happens in an order-driven mar-
ket with a limit-order book.
The MUDA is a rather complex trading mechanism: each subject
trades on both sides of the market, can act at any point in time dur-
ing a trading session, and can choose both the price and the quan-
tity to offer. Nevertheless, it is a well established experimental
trading protocol (for an early analysis, see Plott and Gray, 1990).
Importantly for the purposes of our experiment, the MUDA allows
us to endogenize the fringe of uninformed traders, which is played
by human subjects. In a nutshell, this additional treatment serves
two purposes: understanding whether the results described in
the previous section hold in a different trading mechanism that
resembles more closely actual ﬁnancial markets; and understand-
ing whether substituting liquidity traders with an automaton, as
we have done in Treatments 1 and 2, is an innocuous experimental
design choice.experiment more intuitive, by letting subjects buy and sell without having to borrow
or taking a short position.
14 Because of the quadratic penalty terms, negative payoffs were a likely outcome if
players played off-equilibrium strategies.
15 The only concern, given that the experiment is repeated for many rounds, is that
subjects could collude with some subjects not trading in a round in order to let others
trade at a particularly favorable price. This, however, should not happen according to
the theory (as the game is ﬁnite), and was never observed in the data.
M. Cipriani et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 4310–4326 4315Let us now describe the procedures.16 Each of the ﬁve sessions
consisted of 10 rounds of trading. In each round, the 20 participants
traded in the three markets (A, B and C), which opened sequentially.
Ten subjects played as informed traders (in the experiment, they
were referred to as ‘‘green participants’’) and ten as uninformed trad-
ers (referred to as ‘‘blue participants’’). Each subject had the same
chance of being selected as an informed or an uninformed trader. Sub-
jects kept the same role throughout the experiment.17 Before trading
in each market, subjects were given an endowment of 50 units of the
asset and 15,000 liras, exactly as in the previous treatments.
The value of asset Awas equal to either 0 or 100 (with the same
probability) to green participants (the value was the same for all of
them). Green participants knew how much asset A was worth to
them, whereas blue participants did not know green participants’
asset valuation.18 The value of asset A was 50 for the blue partici-
pants. The value of assets B and C was also worth 50 for all subjects.
Green and blue participants differed not only for the value of as-
set A, but also for the way in which their payoffs were computed.
For green participants, the payoff was identical to that described
in the previous treatments, that is, it was the sum of the trading
proﬁt in each market and the portfolio rebalancing penalties. For
blue participants, the payoff was also the sum of two components:
the trading proﬁt in each market, and a penalty for the exposure in
each market, set equal to 12 q
J
i
 2
. As we mentioned above, given
M = 10, this penalty function implies that the theoretical aggregate
net supply in each market was identical to that in the previous
treatments.
In each session, markets opened in sequence. Trading started in
market A and lasted 220 s. Subjects could choose prices and quan-
tities to buy or sell using the trading platform described in the
Appendix. During the trading session, subjects could use their
endowment of cash and units of the good, but were not allowed
to go short. Both blue and green subjects could post any positive
bid or ask prices for any trade size that respected their budget con-
straint. A trade was automatically executed whenever a new offer
to buy (sell) was at a weakly higher (lower) price than an outstand-
ing offer to sell (buy). Otherwise, the new offer became an out-
standing offer in the book. Note that a new order could be
partially executed (if there were not enough outstanding offers in
the book), or executed at different prices (if the size of the best
buy or sell offer was smaller than the incoming order).
Once the 220 s had passed, subjects received some feedback:
they learned their trading proﬁts, and the loss due to their expo-
sures to market A (for green participants their provisional expo-
sures, computed assuming no exposure to market B). After
receiving the feedback, subjects traded in market B, and, after
receiving additional feedback, in market C. The trading protocol
and the length of trading activity was the same for the three
markets.16 As with Treatments 1 and 2, also Treatment 3 started with subjects reading the
instructions. Before reading the instructions, however, in this treatment subjects
listened to a 15-min Power Point presentation, illustrating the main points of the
experiment. After the presentation and after reading the instructions, subjects were
requested to answer a brief questionnaire. Subjects could also ask clarifying
questions, which an experimenter answered privately. None of the subjects had
difﬁculties in answering the questionnaire, with the exception of one subject in
Session 4. We let this subject try for one round (in which he was inactive), after which
he did not take part in the study.
17 We chose not to have subjects change role during the experiment, so that they
had more opportunities to learn how to play.
18 In the previous treatments, the value of asset A was 0 in odd rounds and 100 in
even rounds. In this treatment, with subjects acting as uninformed traders, we
thought it was important that only informed traders knew the value the asset had for
them, whereas uninformed traders had to infer it from the pattern of trading activity.
Note that, of course, all subjects knew that the value of the asset was 50 for blue
participants in market A, and 50 for all participants in markets B and C.Procedures to pay subjects were identical to those for the other
treatments. To give the same expected payoff to green and blue
participants, we used two different exchange rates: £1 = 100 liras
for green participants and £1 = 200 liras for blue participants. On
average, subjects earned £29 for a 3-h experiment.4. Results
Let us know describe the results. Recall, that in some rounds of
the experiment VA was 0, and in others it was 100. The theoretical
predictions are symmetric for the two cases. For instance, in Treat-
ments 1 and 3, when VA = 0, each informed trader sells 24.39 units
in market A, buys 12.80 units in market B, and sells 8.26 units in
market C; when VA = 100, informed traders trade the same quanti-
ties, but the direction of trade is inverted. Analogously, when
VA = 0, the equilibrium prices in the three markets are 25.61,
62.81 and 41.47; when VA = 100, they are 74.39, 37.19, and
58.26; in both cases, the distance from VA is 25.61, 62.81 and 41.47.
Because of this, in order to simplify the description of the re-
sults, we report them as if the fundamental value of asset A were
always zero in all the rounds; that is, for all rounds in which
VA = 100, we report the quantities with the opposite sign, and the
prices as distances from 100. From now on, whenever we refer to
quantities and prices, they should be interpreted as having being
computed after this transformation.
Let us start by analyzing the experimental results for Treatment
1. In the top panel of Fig. 1, the black dashed line reports, for each
round of trading in market A, the quantities bought or sold per-
subject, averaged across sessions. The other two panels report
the same information for markets B and C. The black solid lines
represent the theoretical counterparts. It is immediate to note that
the quantities traded in the laboratory are very close to the theo-
retical ones in all the three markets; this is true in all rounds of
the experiment, starting from the very ﬁrst ones. Indeed, in market
A, the average quantity sold across all rounds is 23.98, versus a the-
oretical counterpart of 24.39 (see Table 2); using the Mann–Whit-
ney test on the session averages, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the difference between the two numbers is zero
(p-value = 0.62).19 In market B, the average quantity traded across
rounds is 11.08 versus a theoretical counterpart of 12.80; although
the difference is statistically signiﬁcant, it is rather small (1.72 out
of 50 units available per subject). In market C, the average traded
quantity is 7.84 versus a theoretical counterpart of 8.26, a difference
that is not statistically signiﬁcant (p-value = 0.62).
Given that the quantities traded were very close to the theoret-
ical ones, it is not surprising that so were the prices. This is illus-
trated in Fig. 2.
In the top panel of Fig. 2, the dashed black line reports, for each
round of trading, the average price across sessions in market A. In
the other two panels, we report the same information for markets
B and C. The solid black lines represent model’s predictions. Simi-
larly to quantities, prices are always very close to the theoretical
ones in all the three markets. Indeed, in market A, the average price
across all rounds is 26.02, versus a theoretical counterpart of 25.61
(see Table 3). We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the differ-
ence between the two numbers is zero (p-value = 0.62). In market
B, the average price across rounds is 61.08 versus a theoretical
counterpart of 62.08, a difference that although statistically signif-
icant is very small. In market C, the average price is 43.17 versus19 All tests referred to in the paper are Mann–Whitney tests on session averages. We
complement the non-parametric analysis with a panel data estimation reported in
Appendix B. The results of the panel estimation are similar to those of the tests
commented here: the null that theoretical predictions and experimental outcomes
are the same can never be rejected (for any of the markets and of the treatments) in
the panel.
Fig. 1. The ﬁgure shows the average per-capita quantity in each round of the
experiment for the three markets. The dashed black line is the average observed in
T1 and the dotted black line is the average observed in T3. The dashed gray line is
the average observed in T2. The solid lines are the equilibrium predictions for T1–T3
(black line) and for T2 (gray line).
20 Remember that there are only 10 rounds of trading in Treatment 3.
21 We compute simple averages. Weighting by the transaction size gives nearly
identical results.
22 The exceptions are the quantity in market C, where the difference is 2.58 and
signiﬁcant; and the price in market B, where the difference is 7.3 and also signiﬁcant.
Table 2
Average quantities across rounds.
Market A Market B Market C
Treatment 1
Average 23.98 11.08 7.84
p-Value 0.62 0.004 0.62
Treatment 2
Average 27.89 19.04 15.28
p-Value 0.12 0.12 0.12
Treatment 3
Average 27.56 12.09 10.84
p-Value 0.12 0.62 0.004
T1 vs T2: p-value 0.04 0.00 0.004
T1 vs T3: p-value 0.19 0.48 0.12
The table shows the average quantities traded in each market. The p-value refers to
the test of the hypothesis that the observed quantity is different from the theo-
retical prediction. The last two rows present the p-values for the hypotheses that
the quantities are different across treatments.
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value = 0.62).
The empirical results are very similar to the equilibrium predic-
tions, although subjects had to solve a non-trivial backward induc-
tion problem. The deviation from the theoretical predictions are
very similar (and very small) in all markets, irrespective of whether
VA = 0 or VA = 100. We report the results disaggregated by the real-
ization of the fundamentals in the Appendix. The implication is
that subjects do not exhibit a higher level of rationality when they
are buying an asset as opposed to when they are selling it (which
could happen if selling is a less familiar activity than buying). In
other words, there are no behavioral biases making contagion
more severe in times of crisis.
Figs. 1 and 2 also report the results for Treatment 3. Remember
that the equilibrium predictions are the same as those of Treat-
ment 1 (solid black line). The dotted lines, instead, represent theexperimental results.20 Since during the 220 s of trading activity, a
subject could buy and sell many times, for each round, we consider
the aggregate net quantity bought by informed traders and the corre-
sponding average price.21 Once computed the per-round prices and
quantities, in the charts we report the same statistics as in Treat-
ment 1.
Similarly to Treatment 1, the results in Treatment 3 are close to
the theoretical predictions in all three markets. As Figs. 1 and 2
show, prices and quantities move in the right direction in all three
markets (i.e., subjects correctly rebalance their portfolios). Further-
more, the average prices and quantities across all rounds are very
close and mostly not signiﬁcantly different from their theoretical
counterparts (see Tables 2 and 3).22 In particular, the average price
was 23.52 in market A, 55.51 in market B, and 44.49 in market C
(versus theoretical predictions of 25.61, 62.81, and 41.74), thus
showing signiﬁcant contagion effects due to rebalancing motives.
As customary in experiments on double auction markets, we also
considered the average price in the last minute of trading in each
market, which is an indicator of where the price converged. The re-
sults are remarkably similar to the ones described above. In particu-
lar, the prices in the three markets were 21.41, 56.34 and 44.16. Of
course, since the results in Treatments 1 and 3 are close to the same
theoretical prediction they are also very close to each other. Indeed,
the differences between prices an quantities in the two treatments
are not signiﬁcant, with the exception of the price in market B (see
Tables 2 and 3).
Some further considerations are in order. First, in Treatment 3,
subjects chose both prices and quantities; in contrast to Treatment
1, the aggregate quantity did not pin down the price, as the net
supply of the assets was endogenous. It is, therefore, even more
remarkable that the results are relatively close to the equilibrium
ones in all three markets for both prices and quantities.
Second, and more importantly, the rebalancing channel of con-
tagion works in this MUDA treatment as well as it does in the sim-
pler market structure of Treatment 1: a positive (negative) shock in
market A leads to a drop (an increase) in price in market B and to a
rally (a crisis) in market C.
Third, in Treatment 3, there was asymmetric information be-
tween subjects, which complicated the environment faced by sub-
Fig. 2. The ﬁgure shows the average price in each round of the experiment for the
three markets. The dashed black line is the average observed in T1 and the dotted
black line is the average observed in T3. The dashed gray line is the average
observed in T2. The solid lines are the equilibrium predictions for T1–T3 (black line)
and for T2 (gray line).
Table 3
Average prices across rounds.
Market A Market B Market C
Treatment 1
Average 26.02 61.08 43.17
p-Value 0.62 0.00 0.62
Treatment 2
Average 22.12 51.90 34.72
p-Value 0.12 0.12 0.12
Treatment 3
Average 23.52 55.51 44.49
p-Value 0.62 0.00 0.12
T1 vs T2: p-value 0.04 0.004 0.004
T1 vs T3: p-value 0.62 0.01 0.08
The table shows the average prices in each market. The p-value refers to the test of
the hypothesis that the observed price is different from the theoretical prediction.
The last two rows present the p-values for the hypotheses that the prices are dif-
ferent across treatments.
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from occurring in the laboratory.
Let us now move to the description of the experimental results
in Treatment 2. Recall that in this treatment, since the price elastic-
ity in market B (the ‘‘ﬁnancial center’’) is lower, rebalancing from
market A to market C is less expensive. As a result, subjects should
realize that they can trade more aggressively in market A. This is
actually what happens in the laboratory, as one can immediately
see from Figs. 1 and 2 (gray lines) and Tables 2 and 3 (for the aver-
age results across all rounds).
Note that, as theory predicts, subjects trade more aggressively
in market A than they do in Treatment 1; they sell, on average,
27.89 units as opposed to only 23.98 in Treatment 1, a statistically
signiﬁcant difference (p-value = 0.04). As a result, the incentive to
rebalance from B to C is stronger: the quantity traded raises to
19.04 in market B and to 15.28 in market C (the p-values for thenull that these quantities are the same as in Treatment 1 are 0.00
and 0.00). Because of the higher rebalancing, the price of asset C
is further away from its fundamental value than in Treatment 1,
43.17 versus 34.72, a statistically signiﬁcant difference (p-va-
lue = 0.004). That is, there is a stronger contagion effect from A to
C due to the rebalancing channel from one market to the other.
Our experimental results support the hypothesis advanced by
Kodres and Pritsker (2002) that when the degree of asymmetric
information in developed economies diminishes, contagion effects
across developing countries become stronger.
Finally, although in Treatment 2 the equilibrium is different, the
empirical quantities and prices are extremely close to the theoret-
ical ones, as was the case for the other treatments. The Mann–
Whitney test for the hypotheses that the average prices or quanti-
ties are the same as in the Cournot equilibrium cannot reject the
null hypothesis in any of the markets.
5. Conclusions
This paper tests the rebalancing channel of contagion, ﬁrst pro-
posed by Kodres and Pritsker (2002), with a laboratory experiment.
We develop a simple model which can be brought to the labora-
tory, and then test its predictions. The experimental data are sup-
portive of the theory. Rebalancing from one market to the other is
very strong in the laboratory, creating signiﬁcant contagion effects.
The results are remarkably robust across different market struc-
tures. The theoretical predictions are supported in a simple exper-
imental set up akin to a Cournot game as well as in a multi-unit
double auction. Moreover, the experimental data support the idea
that a decrease in asymmetric information in the developed ﬁnan-
cial center increases the transmission of ﬁnancial shocks across
developing markets. Overall, our results show that the rebalancing
channel of ﬁnancial contagion as described in the rational expecta-
tion framework of Kodres and Pritsker (2002) is not only theoreti-
cally appealing but also able to capture human subjects actual
behavior. While our results are encouraging, an important issue
that our study cannot address is in which markets this channel
of contagion is more relevant. This is an issue left for future
research.
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2Appendix A. Additional tests
See Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3.Table A.1
Average quantities and prices when the value of asset A was 100.
Market A Market B Market C
pA xAi
 
pB xBi
 
pC xCi
 
Treatment 1
Average 74.67 (24.67) 37.87 (12.13) 57.23 (7.23)
p-Value 0.62 (0.62) 0.62 (0.62) 0.62 (0.62)
Treatment 2
Average 78.38 (28.38) 48.01 (19.88) 66.19 (16.19)
p-Value 0.12 (0.12) 0.62 (0.62) 0.12 (0.12)
Treatment 3
Average 77.62 (25.49) 44.46 (10.92) 55.40 (10.12)
p-Value 0.62 (0.12) 0.004 (0.12) 0.12 (0.004)
The table shows the average prices (quantities) traded in each market. The p-value
refers to the test of the hypothesis that the observations are different from the
theoretical prediction.
Table A.2
Average quantities and prices when the value of asset A was 0.
Market A Market B Market C
pA xAi
 
pB xBi
 
pC xCi
 
Treatment 1
Average 26.72 (23.28) 60.03 (10.03) 41.56 (8.44)
p-Value 0.62 (0.62) 0.004 (0.004) 0.62 (0.62)
Treatment 2
Average 22.61 (27.39) 51.82 (18.19) 35.63 (14.37)
p-Value 0.62 (0.62) 0.12 (0.12) 0.62 (0.62)
Treatment 3
Average 25.23 (30.67) 55.46 (13.84) 44.34 (11.93)
p-Value 0.62 (0.12) 0.004 (0.62) 0.12 (0.004)
The table shows the average prices (quantities) traded in each market. The p-value
refers to the test of the hypothesis that the observations are different from the
Table A.3
Tests that the Differences between the Actual and the Equilibrium Prices and
Quantities are the Same between Treatments.
Market A Market B Market C
pA xAi
 
pB xBi
 
pC xCi
 
V = 0
T1 vs T2: p-value 0.62 (0.62) 0.004 (0.92) 0.62 (0.62)
T1 vs T3: p-value 0.62 (0.19) 0.02 (0.02) 0.04((0.07)
T2 vs T3: p-value 0.62 (0.08) 0.004 (0.08) 0.02 (0.19)
V = 100
T1 vs T2: p-value 0.48 (0.48) 0.62 (0.92) 0.12 (0.12)
T1 vs T3: pp-value 0.62 (0.92) 0.01 (0.36) 0.36 (0.26)
T2 vs T3: p-value 0.48 (0.12) 0.003 (0.77) 0.04 (0.62)
Combined
T1 vs T2: p-value 0.76 (0.76) 0.004 (0.62) 0.48 (0.48)
T1 vs T3: p-value 0.27 (0.12) 0.01 (0.77) 0.02 (0.19)
T2 vs T3: p-value 0.19 (0.19) 0.004 (0.62) 0.12 (0.37)
The table shows the p-values for the test of the hypothesis that the differences
between the actual and the equilibrium prices and quantities are the same between
treatments.
R 0.0215 0.0228 0.0008
T1 = T2 0.088 0.809 0.286
T1 = T3 0.129 0.004 0.983
Table B.2
Panel Regression for Prices.
Dependent variable: P  PEq
Market A Market B Market C
Treatment 1 0.696 1.049 0.609
(0.019) (0.198) (0.597)
Treatment 2 0.495 0.085 0.909
(0.523) (0.285) (0.108)
Treatment 3 2.607 1.559 0.841
(0.164) (0.423) (0.393)
R2 0.0451 0.0246 0.0141
T1 = T2 0.819 0.220 0.211
T1 = T3 0.278 0.241 0.876Appendix B. Panel estimation
The tables report the results of a panel data estimation. We
regressed the per-round difference between the quantity actually
traded and the equilibrium prediction on the treatment condi-
tions. We did so separately, market by market. The standard er-
rors are clustered at the session level. P-values for the test that a
coefﬁcient is equal to 0 are reported in parenthesis. The null
hypothesis that theoretical predictions and experimental out-
comes are the same can never be rejected, for any of the mar-
kets and of the treatments in the panel. Moreover, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the differences between actual
and theoretical quantities and prices are the same across treat-
ments (see Tables B.1 and B.2).Appendix C. Instructions for Treatment 1
Welcome to our study! We hope you will enjoy it.
You’re about to take part in a study on decision making with
nine other participants. Everyone in the study has the same
instructions. Go through them carefully. If something in the
instructions is not clear and you have questions, please, do not hes-
itate to ask for clariﬁcation. Please, do not ask your questions
loudly or try to communicate with other participants. We will be
happy to answer your questions privately.
Depending on your choices and those of the other participants,
you will earn some money. You will receive the money immedi-
ately after the experiment.
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In the study, you will be asked to buy or sell in sequence three
goods: A, B and C. First, you will buy or sell good A in market A;
then good B in market B and, ﬁnally, good C in market C.
The values of the goods are expressed in a ﬁctitious currency
called ‘‘lira’’, which will be converted into pounds at the end of
the experiment according to the following exchange rate:
£1 ¼ 100 liras:
This means that for any 100 liras that you earn, you will receive
1 GBP.
In each market, you will trade with a computer (and not among
yourselves). In particular, you will be asked to choose the quantity
you want to buy from the computer or sell to it. The computer will
set the price at which each of you can buy or sell based on the deci-
sions of all participants.
C.2. The rules
The experiment consists of 20 rounds. The rules are identical for
all rounds. All of you will participate in all rounds.
Each round is composed of three steps. In the ﬁrst step, you
trade in market A. Then market A closes and market B opens. Final-
ly, when market B closes, market C opens.
At the beginning of every round we will provide you with an
endowment of 50 units of each good (that is, 50 units of good A,
50 of good B and 50 of good C) and with 15,000 liras, which you
can use to buy or sell.
At the end of each round, you will receive information about
how much you earned in that round, and then you will move to
the next round.
C.3. Procedures for each round
A the beginning of each round, you trade good A in market A.
Market A: The value of good A can be either 0 or 100 liras. In all
the odd rounds (1–3–5. . .) the value is 0; in all the even rounds (2–
4–6. . .) the value is 100.
C.3.1. Your trading decision
In market A, you are asked to choose how many units you want
to buy or sell. You can sell up to 50 units (which is your initial
endowment of good A), and buy at most 50 units.
When the value of the good is 0, you will be asked to indicate
how many units you want to sell. When the value of the good is
100, you will be asked to indicate how many units you want to
buy.
In the screen, there is a Box where you indicate the number of
units of good A that you want to buy or sell by clicking on the BUY
or SELL button.
C.3.2. The price
After all of you have chosen, the computer will calculate the
price of good A in the following way:
PriceA ¼ 50þ 1=10  ðTotalAÞ;
where
TotalA ¼ TotalA Bought  TotalA Sold
TotalABought = sum of the units of the good A bought by all
those who decide to buy and TotalASold = sum of the units of the
good A sold by all those who decide to sell.
Example 1. Assume that the value of good A is 100 and that the
quantities of good A bought by the participants are as follows:Participant Units Bought Units Sold TotalA1 45
2 10
3 30
4 15
5 30
6 20
7 26
8 50
9 18
10 8Tot 252 0 252Since the TotalA is equal to TotalABought  TotalA-
Sold = 252  0 = 252, the price will be:
PriceA ¼ 50þ 1=10  ðTotalAÞ ¼ 50þ 1=10  ð252Þ ¼ 75:2Example 2. Assume that the value of good A is 0 and that all par-
ticipants decide to sell 15 units, so that TotalA is equal to TotalA-
Bought  TotalASold = 0  150 = 150. The price will be:
PriceA ¼ 50þ 1=10  ðTotalAÞ ¼ 50þ 1=10  ð150Þ ¼ 35
In general, the more participants want to buy, the higher the
price you will have to pay for each unit. The more participants
want to sell, the lower the price you will receive for each unit.
To help you to familiarize with the way the computer sets the
price, we provide you with a table (see Table C.1) where you can
see the price of the good given some possible combinations of your
choices and those of the other participants.
After everyone has made his/her decision and the computer has
computed the price, on the screen you will see a summary of your
decision, the decisions of the other participants, and the resulting
price and earnings.
After that, you will start trading in market B.
Market B: The value of good B is 50 in all rounds.
C.3.3. Your trading decision
Exactly as before, you will simply be asked to choose howmany
units of good B you want to buy or sell. You can sell up to
50 units, that is, your initial endowment of good B, and buy at most
50 units.
In the screen, there is a Box where you indicate the number of
units of good B that you want to buy or sell, by clicking on the BUY
or SELL button.
Note that in market B, differently to market A, since the value is
50 in any given round you will have to decide whether you want to
buy or sell.
The price
After all of you have chosen, the price is computed in an iden-
tical way to the price of good A, that is,
PriceB ¼ 50þ 1=10  ðTotalBÞ;
where
TotalB ¼ TotalB Bought  TotalB Sold
TotalB Bought = sum of the units of the good B bought by all
those who decide to buy and TotalB Sold = sum of the units of the
good B sold by all those who decide to sell.
Example 1. The value of good B is 50. Assume that the quantities
of it bought/sold by the participants are as follows:
Table C.1
Prices of goods given your choices and those of the other participants.
Your choice Average units bought/sold by each of the other participants?
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
5 55.00 59.50 64.00 68.50 73.00 77.50 82.00 86.50 91.00 95.50 46.00 41.50 37.00 32.50 28.00 23.50 19.00 14.50 10.00 5.50
10 55.50 60.00 64.50 69.00 73.50 78.00 82.50 87.00 91.50 96.00 46.50 42.00 37.50 33.00 28.50 24.00 19.50 15.00 10.50 6.00
15 56.00 60.50 65.00 69.50 74.00 78.50 83.00 87.50 92.00 96.50 47.00 42.50 38.00 33.50 29.00 24.50 20.00 15.50 11.00 6.50
20 56.50 61.00 65.50 70.00 74.50 79.00 83.50 88.00 92.50 97.00 47.50 43.00 38.50 34.00 29.50 25.00 20.50 16.00 11.50 7.00
25 57.00 61.50 66.00 70.50 75.00 79.50 84.00 88.50 93.00 97.50 48.00 43.50 39.00 34.50 30.00 25.50 21.00 16.50 12.00 7.50
30 57.50 62.00 66.50 71.00 75.50 80.00 84.50 89.00 93.50 98.00 48.50 44.00 39.50 35.00 30.50 26.00 21.50 17.00 12.50 8.00
35 58.00 62.50 67.00 71.50 76.00 80.50 85.00 89.50 94.00 98.50 49.00 44.50 40.00 35.50 31.00 26.50 22.00 17.50 13.00 8.50
40 58.50 63.00 67.50 72.00 76.50 81.00 85.50 90.00 94.50 99.00 49.50 45.00 40.50 36.00 31.50 27.00 22.50 18.00 13.50 9.00
45 59.00 63.50 68.00 72.50 77.00 81.50 86.00 90.50 95.00 99.50 50.00 45.50 41.00 36.50 32.00 27.50 23.00 18.50 14.00 9.50
50 59.50 64.00 68.50 73.00 77.50 82.00 86.50 91.00 95.50 100.00 50.50 46.00 41.50 37.00 32.50 28.00 23.50 19.00 14.50 10.00
5 54.00 58.50 63.00 67.50 72.00 76.50 81.00 85.50 90.00 94.50 45.00 40.50 36.00 31.50 27.00 22.50 18.00 13.50 9.00 4.50
10 53.50 58.00 62.50 67.00 71.50 76.00 80.50 85.00 89.50 94.00 44.50 40.00 35.50 31.00 26.50 22.00 17.50 13.00 8.50 4.00
15 53.00 57.50 62.00 66.50 71.00 75.50 80.00 84.50 89.00 93.50 44.00 39.50 35.00 30.50 26.00 21.50 17.00 12.50 8.00 3.50
20 52.50 57.00 61.50 66.00 70.50 75.00 79.50 84.00 88.50 93.00 43.50 39.00 34.50 30.00 25.50 21.00 16.50 12.00 7.50 3.00
25 52.00 56.50 61.00 65.50 70.00 74.50 79.00 83.50 88.00 92.50 43.00 38.50 34.00 29.50 25.00 20.50 16.00 11.50 7.00 2.50
30 51.50 56.00 60.50 65.00 69.50 74.00 78.50 83.00 87.50 92.00 42.50 38.00 33.50 29.00 24.50 20.00 15.50 11.00 6.50 2.00
35 51.00 55.50 60.00 64.50 69.00 73.50 78.00 82.50 87.00 91.50 42.00 37.50 33.00 28.50 24.00 19.50 15.00 10.50 6.00 1.50
40 50.50 55.00 59.50 64.00 68.50 73.00 77.50 82.00 86.50 91.00 41.50 37.00 32.50 28.00 23.50 19.00 14.50 10.00 5.50 1.00
45 50.00 54.50 59.00 63.50 68.00 72.50 77.00 81.50 86.00 90.50 41.00 36.50 32.00 27.50 23.00 18.50 14.00 9.50 5.00 0.50
50 49.50 54.00 58.50 63.00 67.50 72.00 76.50 81.00 85.50 90.00 40.50 36.00 31.50 27.00 22.50 18.00 13.50 9.00 4.50 0.00
Notes:
1. Positive numbers indicate purchases, negative numbers indicate sales.
2. The table shows the price given your choice and the average choice of the other participants. For instance, suppose you choose 20 and the other participants on average
choose 30. This means that, since on average the other nine participants want to buy 30, the total demanded quantity is 20 + 30  9 = 290 and the price is 50 + 1/
10  (290) = 79.
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2 15
3 6
4 35
5 20
6 2
7 24
8 16
9 25
10 20Tot 137 36 101As TotalB is equal to TotalB Bought  TotalB Sold = 137  36 = 101,
the price will be:
PriceB ¼ 50þ 1=10  ðTotalBÞ ¼ 50þ 1=10  ð101Þ ¼ 60:1Example 2. Assume that all participants decide to sell 15 units, so
that TotalB is equal to TotalB Bought  TotalB Sold = 0  150 = 150.
The price will be:
PriceB ¼ 50þ 1=10  ðTotalBÞ ¼ 50þ 1=10  ð150Þ ¼ 35
Note that, like for the price of good B, the more participants
want to buy, the higher the price you will have to pay for each unit.
The more participants want to sell, the lower the price you will
receive for each unit. In particular, since the price is set in an iden-
tical way to that of good A, you can consult the table at the end of
the instructions (see Table C.1) to see the price corresponding to
different combinations of your choice and those of the other
participants.
After everyone has made his/her decision and the computer
has computed the price, on the screen you will see a summary
of your decision, the decisions of the other participants, and the
resulting price and earnings. After that, you will start trading in
market C.Market C: The value of good C is 50 in all rounds.C.3.4. Your trading decision
Analogously to market B, you will simply be asked to choose
how many units of good C you want to buy or sell. You can sell
up to 50 units, that is, your initial endowment of good C, and
buy at most 50 units.
In the screen, there is a Box where you indicate the number of
units of good C that you want to buy or sell, by clicking on the BUY
or SELL button.
Note that in market C, as it was in market B, since the value is 50
in any given round you will have to decide whether you want to
buy or sell.C.3.5. The price
After everyone has made his/her decision, the computer will
compute the price of good C with the same rule as for good A
and B, that is,
PriceC ¼ 50þ 1=10  ðTotalCÞ;
where
TotalC ¼ TotalC Bought  TotalC Sold
TotalC Bought = sum of the units of the good C bought by all
those who decide to buy and TotalC Sold = sum of the units of the
good C sold by all those who decide to sell.
Note that, similarly to markets A and B, the more participants
want to buy, the higher the price you will have to pay for each unit.
The more participants want to sell, the lower the price you will re-
ceive for each unit. As for the other markets, the table at the end of
the instructions gives you the prices corresponding to different
combinations of your choice and those of the other participants.
After everyone has made his/her decision and the computer has
computed the price, on the screen you will see a summary of your
decision, the decisions of the other participants, and the resulting
price and earnings.
After that, you will receive a summary of your trading activity in
the entire round and you will learn your per-round payoff.
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As we said, at the beginning of each round we give you an
endowment of 50 units of each good and of 15,000 liras so that
you can sell the goods (if you want) or buy more of them (by
spending your liras). At the end of the round, we will take these
endowments back, so that your payoff only depends on the proﬁts
or losses made while trading and not on the endowment.
In particular, your payoff will depend on two components:
1. The earning you made in each market.
2. Two ‘‘penalty terms’’.
The per-round payoff will be equal to
EarningA þ EarningB þ EarningC  Penalty 1 Penalty 2
Let us see what these terms are.
1. The earning in market A is computed in the following way:
 if you BUY,EarningA ¼ ðValueA  PriceAÞ
 ðUnits of A good you boughtÞ:This is because for each unit that you buy you receive the value of
the good but you have to pay the price;
 if you SELL,EarningA ¼ ðPriceA  ValueAÞ  ðUnits of A good you soldÞ:This is because for each unit that you sell you receive a price and
you will lose the value of the good you owned.
Similarly, for market B,
 EarningB = (ValueB  PriceB)  (Units of B good you
bought), if you BUY
 EarningB = (PriceB  ValueB)  (Units of B good you sold), if
you SELL
And for market C,
 EarningC = (ValueC  PriceC)  (Units of C good you
bought), if you BUY
 EarningC = (PriceC  ValueC)  (Units of C good you sold), if
you SELL
2. The ‘‘penalty terms’’ are the following:
 Penalty_1 = (unitsA + unitsB)2
 Penalty_2 = (unitsB + unitsC)2
where unitsA, unitsB, unitsC are your trading ‘‘exposure’’ in each
market. What is your trading exposure? It is the number of units
you decided to buy if you bought, or, with a negative sign, the
number of units you decided to sell if you sold.
How to interpret the penalty terms? Consider Penalty_1. If the
sum of unitsA + unitsB is equal to 0 the penalty is zero, meaning
you are not penalized. If it is different from 0, then you will pay
a penalty. Note that it does not matter whether the term is higher
or lower than 0, since the penalty term is squared. Note also, that
the more this sum is different from 0, the higher the penalty term.
That is, your Penalty_1 will be the greater the further away your
combined trading exposure in market A and B is from zero.
The same is true forPenalty_2 = (unitsB + unitsC)2. That is, your
Penalty_2 will be the greater the further away your combined
trading exposure in market B and C is from zero.
Note that Penalty_1 only depends on your combined trading
exposure in markets A and B, whereas Penalty_2 only depends
on your combined trading exposure in market B and C.Example 1. For instance, if in market A you bought 20 units, in
market B you sold 10 units and in market C you bought 5 units,
then the penalty terms will be: Penalty_1 = (unitsA + unitsB)2 = (20  10)2 = (10)2 = 100
 Penalty_2 = (unitsB + unitsC)2 = (10 + 5)2 = (5)2 = 25
Therefore, we will subtract 125 (Penalty_1 + Pen-
alty_2 = 100 + 25) from the earnings you got trading in the 3
markets A, B and C.Example 2. If in market A you sold 35 units, in market B you sold
30 units and in market C you sold 20 units, then the penalty terms
will be:
 Penalty_1 = (unitsA + unitsB)2 = (35  30)2 = (65)2 = 4225
 Penalty_2 = (unitsB + unitsC)2 = (30  20)2 = (50)2 = 2500
Therefore, we will subtract 6725 (Penalty_1 + Pen-
alty_2 = 4225 + 2500) from the earnings you got trading in the 3
markets A, B and C.
To sum all up, the per-round payoff is the sum of the trading
earnings in the three markets and the two Penalties: EarningA + EarningB + EarningC  Penalty_1  Penalty_2
Note, however, that if this sum is lower than zero (that is, you
have made a loss and not a proﬁt), then your per-round payoff will
be set equal to zero. This guarantees that, in each round, you never
lose money.C.5. Payment
To determine your ﬁnal payment, we will sum up your per-
round payoffs for all the 20 rounds. We will then convert this
sum into pounds at the exchange rate of 100 liras = £1. That is,
for every 100 liras you have earned in the experiment you will
get 1 lb. Moreover, you will receive a participation fee of £5 just
for showing up on time. We will pay you in cash (in private) at
the end of the experiment.
Appendix D. Instructions for Treatment 3
Welcome to our study! We hope you will enjoy it.
You are about to take part in a study on decision making with
19 other participants. Everyone in the study has the same instruc-
tions. Go through them carefully. If something in the instructions is
not clear and you have questions, please, do not hesitate to ask for
clariﬁcation. Please, do not ask your questions loudly or try to com-
municate with other participants. We will be happy to answer your
questions privately.
Depending on your choices and those of the other participants,
you will earn some money. You will receive the money immedi-
ately after the experiment.D.1. Outline of the study
In the study, you will be asked to trade in sequence three goods:
A, B and C. First, you will trade good A in market A; then good B in
market B and, ﬁnally, good C in market C.
The values of the goods are expressed in a ﬁctitious currency
called ‘‘lira’’, which will be exchanged into pounds at the end of
the study according to a predetermined exchange rate.
The study consists of 10 rounds. The rules are identical for all
rounds. All of you will participate in all rounds.
Fig. D1.
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sequence. First, you trade good A in market A. Then market A
closes, and market B opens (i.e., you trade good B in market B). Fi-
nally, market B closes, and you trade in market C.
At the end of each round, you will receive information about
how much you earned in that round, and then you will move to
the next round.D.2. Procedures for each round
D.2.1. Green and Blue participants
In each round of the study, each of you will be assigned a color:
Green or Blue. In each round, there will be 10 Blue and 10 Green
participants. The computer will randomly determine whether
you are Blue or Green. You have the same chance of being Blue
or Green. You remain a Blue or a Green trader throughout the en-
tire experiment.
Blue and Green participants do exactly the same thing: they buy
and sell the goods in the three markets. The only difference is in
how the goods are worth to them and how their payoff is
computed.
As we said, at the beginning of each round, you start by trading
good A. We will now describe how the value of good A is deter-
mined and how it is traded.
Market A: The value of good A is different depending on
whether you are a Blue or a Green participant. In particular, it is
worth: always 50 liras for Blue participants;
 either 0 or 100 liras for Green participants. In each round, the
computer will randomly determine whether the value for the
Green participants is 0 or 100 through a mechanism simulating
the toss of a coin. In other words, the chances of the value being
0 or 100 in each round are 50–50. Note that in each round the
value is the same for all Green participants.Note also that
whether the value in a round is 0 or 100 does not depend on
the value in previous rounds.
Green participants know how much good A is worth to them.
They learn whether the value is 0 or 100 at the beginning of each
round.
Blue and Green participants trade good A among themselves for
220 s. At the end of the 220 s, all participants receive information
on the outcomes of their trading activity.
Let us illustrate how you will trade the good. In Fig. D1 you see a
screen-shot of the trading platform on your computer. In the upper
part of the screen, there are two boxes showing the existing Buy
Offers and Sell Offers. In the lower part, there are buttons that
you can use to buy or sell, and two boxes, one where you can insert
the quantity you want to buy or sell, and another where you can
insert the price at which you are willing to do so.
On the top right-hand side you can see your holdings of cash
and units of good A (i.e., your portfolio, in the box ‘‘Portfolio Sum-
mary’’). In the middle of the right-hand side (box ‘‘Last 10 Transac-
tions’’), you see a continuously updated history of the prices at
Fig. D2.
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the screen (‘‘My Recent Transactions’’), you can see the transac-
tions you have executed in the round.D.2.2. Initial endowment
At the beginning of every round we will provide you with an
endowment of 50 units of good A and with 5000 liras, which you
can use to buy or sell.
You can use your endowment to trade good A during the round.
The box ‘‘Portfolio Summary’’ is updated whenever you buy or sell
units of the good. When you buy the good, the number of units of
the good in your portfolio (see line ‘‘Current Portfolio’’) increases
by the number of units you have bought, and the amount of liras
decreases by the amount you have paid. Similarly when you sell
the good.D.2.3. How to sell or buy
Buying and selling is very simple. Look at the box ‘‘Make a New
Sell Offer’’, in the middle of the screen. If you want to sell good A,
you simply enter:
 the number of units you want to sell;
 the minimum price at which you want to sell them.
Then you click on the button SELL and your offer appears imme-
diately in the box ‘‘Best Open Sell Offers’’, (top section of thescreen, in the middle), where open sell offers are collected. The
open sell offers are ordered with the lowest price being on the
top of the list.
When you enter a sell offer, the line ‘‘Available to buy/sell’’ in
the ‘‘Portfolio Summary’’ box is updated to reﬂect that the units
you offered to sell cannot be offered for sale twice. When your offer
gets executed (we will explain in a second how), your ‘‘Current
Porftolio’’ line in the ‘‘Porfolio Summary’’ box will get updated
(as we had mentioned before).
Similarly, if you want to buy good A, you simply enter:
 the number of units you want to buy;
 the maximum price at which you want to buy them
in the box ‘‘Make a New Buy Offer’’, in the middle left-part of the
screen. Then you click on the button BUY and your offer appears
immediately in the column ‘‘Best Open Buy Offers’’ (top section
of the screen, on the left), where all open buy offers are collected.
The open buy offers are ordered with the highest price being on the
top of the list. You can easily identify your own buy offers because
they are marked with a button that gives you the opportunity to
cancel them, if you so wish.
Your own offers are also listed in the boxes ‘‘My Open Buy Of-
fers’’ and ‘‘My Open Sell Offers’’, on the bottom of the screen. You
are always allowed to withdraw your buy or sell offer that have
not been executed. These two boxes allow you to do so. Just click
on Cancel on the order you want to withdraw.
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lowest Sell Price is lower than the highest Buy Price. In this situa-
tion, one participant is willing to pay more for good A than another
participant asks for it. This situation is recognized by the system
and trading takes place automatically. We will illustrate how trad-
ing occurs through a series of examples. Go over them carefully,
and you will learn how to trade in this market.
Example 1. Look at Fig. D1. The lowest Sell Price is 55 liras for 30
units of good A and the highest Buy Price is 50 liras for 10 units of
good A. Then, no trade is possible. If you are willing to buy 10 units
at 55 liras, you enter a Buy Price of 55 liras for 10 units into the
system. The system recognizes that a trade is now possible for 10
units and the trade takes place: that is, the seller receives
55  10 = 550 liras from you and you (the buyer) receive 10 units
of the good from the seller.
The transaction always occurs at the pre-existing price. For
instance, even if you enter a Buy Price of 61 in the system, since
there is a pre-existing sell order at a price of 55, the transaction
will occur at 55 liras–not at 61. In other words, if you see a Sell
Price at which you are willing to buy, it is enough that you enter a
Buy Price equal or greater than that in order to buy the good.Example 2. In Fig. D2, the highest Buy Price is 30 liras for 8 units of
good A. If you are willing to sell at 30 liras, then you enter a Sell
Price lower than or equal to 30 liras into the system and the num-
ber of units you want to sell. Suppose you want to sell 8 units at a
price of 30. The system recognizes that a trade is possible and trade
takes place: that is, you (the seller) receive 30  8 = 240 liras from
the buyer and the buyer receives 8 units of the good from you.
Obviously, if you want to sell fewer than 8 units you are free to
do so. You do so by entering a sell offer for, say, 5 units at a price of
30. In this case, the system will automatically execute the trade
and you will receive 30  5 = 150 liras from the buyer.Example 3. Look at Fig. D2, and consider the two best sell offers.
There is an outstanding offer to sell 10 units of good A at a price
of 40, and another outstanding offer to sell 40 units at a price of
45. Suppose that you are willing to buy 20 units, and you submit
an offer to buy 20 at a price of 45. The system will match your
buy request with the best existing sell offers. Therefore, you will
buy the ﬁrst 10 units at a price of 40 and the second 10 units at
the price of 45.
As we said before, the list of recent prices at which a transaction
took place appears in the box ‘‘Last 10 Transaction’’ in the middle
part of the right-hand section of the screen. The most recent
transaction prices are on the top of the list. Your own transactions
are identiﬁed in the box at the bottom so that you can keep track of
your previous decisions.
After 200 s have passed, market A shuts down. On the screen
you will see your payoff for your trading activity in market A. After
that, you will start trading in market B.
Market B: Trading in market B follows the same rules as in mar-
ket A. Again, we will provide you with an endowment of 50 units of
good B and with 5000 liras, which you can use to buy or sell. An
important difference with market A, however, is that the value of
good B is 50 liras in all rounds for both Green and Blue participants.
As in market A, trading in market B lasts 200 s. When this time
has elapsed, market B shuts down. On the screen you will see your
payoff for your trading activity in markets A and B. After that, you
will start trading in market C.Market C: Trading in market C follows the same rules as in mar-
ket A and B. Again, we will provide you with an endowment of 50
units of good C and with 5000 liras. In contrast with market A and
exactly as in market B, the value of good C is 50 liras in all rounds
for both Green and Blue participants.
As in markets A and B, trading in market C lasts 200 s. When this
time has elapsed, market C shuts down. On the screen you will see
your payoff for your trading activity in markets A, B and C. At this
point, the current round of the game ends, and you start the next
round. The game ends at round 10.D.3. Per-round payoff
Your ﬁnal payoff is the sum of the payoffs in the 10 rounds. In
each round, the per-round payoff is made up of two components:
 The earning you made in each market (A, B and C);minus One ‘‘Penalty Term’’.
We will ﬁrst describe how to compute the earning made in each
market, and then we will describe the penalty term.D.3.1. Market earnings
As we said, in each round we give you an endowment of 50
units of each good and of 5000 liras for each market so that you
can sell the goods (if you want) or buy more of them (by spending
your liras). At the end of the round, we will take these endowments
back, so that your payoff only depends on the proﬁts or losses
made while trading and not on the endowment. As a result, the
earning in market A is computed in the following way.
Whenever you buy at a certain price you have to pay that price
for each unit. At the same time, you will receive the value of the
good for each unit. Therefore,
 when you BUY, you gain or loseðValueA  PriceAÞ  ðUnits of good A that you boughtÞ:For instance, let us assume that you are a Green participant, and
the value of the good is 100. If you buy 10 units at the price of 70,
you earn (100  70)  10 = 300 liras. If instead the value is 0, then
your earning is (0  70)  10 = 700, that is, you lose 700 liras. If
you are a Blue participant, the value of the good is always 50,
and your earning is (50  70)  10 = 200, that is you lose 200.
Similarly, whenever you sell at a certain price you receive that
price for each unit but are forgoing the value of the good for each
unit. Therefore,
 when you SELL, you gain or lose
ðPriceA  ValueAÞ  ðUnits of good A that you soldÞ:
For instance, let us assume that you are a Green participant, and
the value of the good is 100. When you sell 10 units at the price of
70, your earning is (70  100)  10 = 300 liras, that is, you lose
300 liras. If instead the value is 0, then you earn
(70  0)  10 = 700 liras. If you are a Blue participant, the value of
the good is always 50 and you earn (70  50)  10 = 200.
The computations of your earnings in market B are similar.
Remember that the value of good B is always 50 for both green
and blue participants. Therefore,
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ðValueB  PriceBÞ  ðUnits of good B that you boughtÞ
¼ ð50 PriceBÞ  ðUnits of good B that you boughtÞ: when you SELL, you gain or lose
ðPriceB  ValueBÞ  ðUnits of good B that you soldÞ
¼ ðPriceB  50Þ  ðUnits of good B that you soldÞ:The earning in market C is computed in the same way as in mar-
ket B. Since the value of good C is always the same for both green
and blue participant:
 when you BUY, you gain or lose
ðValueC  PriceCÞ  ðUnits of good C that you boughtÞ
¼ ð50 PriceCÞ  ðUnits of good C that you boughtÞ: when you SELL, you gain or lose
ðPriceC  ValueCÞ  ðUnits of good C that you soldÞ
¼ ðPriceC  50Þ  ðUnits of good C that you soldÞ:D.3.2. Penalty term for Green participants
The Penalty term is computed differently for Green and Blue
participants. For Green participants, the Penalty Terms is the sum
of two penalties:
 Penalty_1 = (unitsA + unitsB)2
 Penalty_2 = (unitsB + unitsC)2
where unitsA, unitsB, unitsC are the participant’s trading ‘‘expo-
sure’’ in each market. What is your trading exposure? It is the total
number of units you bought (with a positive sign) or sold (with a
negative sign) in the market at the end of trading activity (i.e., after
200 s). Consider for instance market A. Suppose that you are a
Green participant and at the end of the round, you have 70 units
of good A in the portfolio. Since you had an endowment of 50 units,
this means that during the 200 s of trading you bought 20 units of
good A. This is your exposure in market A. Suppose instead you
have 35 units in your portfolio. This means that you have sold 15
units out of your endowment. Your exposure in market A is then
15.
How to interpret the Penalty Term for Green participants? Con-
sider Penalty_1. If the sum of unitsA + unitsB is equal to 0 the pen-
alty is zero, meaning you are not penalized. If it is different from 0,
then you will pay a penalty. Note that the further away this sum is
from 0, the higher the penalty term. That is, your Penalty_1 will be
the greater the further away your combined trading exposure in
market A and B is from zero. Note also that it does not matter
whether your combined exposure is positive or negative, since
the penalty term is squared. That is, you will pay the same penalty
if unitA + unitB is 10 as if it is negative 10.
The same is true for Penalty_2 = (unitsB + unitsC)2. That is, your
Penalty_2 will be the greater the further away your combined
trading exposure in market B and C is from zero.
Note that Penalty_1 only depends on your combined trading
exposure in markets A and B, whereas Penalty_2 only depends
on your combined trading exposure in market B and C.
When you ﬁnish trading in Market A, your provisional Penalty_1
will be shown to you on the screen. It is provisional, since the pen-
alty also depends on your activity in Market B. When you ﬁnish
trading in Market B, on the screen you will see the ﬁnal Penalty_1
and the provisional Penalty_2. Penalty_2 is only provisional, since it
will then depend also on the activity in Market C.Example 1. For instance, let us say that you are a Green partic-
ipant and in market A you bought 20 units, in market B you sold 10
units and in market C you bought 5 units. Then your penalty terms
will be: Penalty_1 = (unitsA + unitsB)2 = (20  10)2 = (10)2 = 100
 Penalty_2 = (unitsB + unitsC)2 = (10 + 5)2 = (5)2 = 25
Therefore, we will subtract 125 (Penalty_1 + Pen-
alty_2 = 100 + 25) from the earnings you got trading in the 3
markets A, B and C.Example 2. If in market A you sold 35 units, in market B you sold
30 units and in market C you sold 20 units, then the penalty terms
will be:
 Penalty_1 = (unitsA + unitsB)2 = (35  30)2 = (65)2 = 4225
 Penalty_2 = (unitsB + unitsC)2 = (30  20)2 = (50)2 = 2500
Therefore, we will subtract 6725 (Penalty_1 + Pen-
alty_2 = 4225 + 2500) from the earnings you got trading in the 3
markets A, B and C.D.3.3. Penalty Term for Blue participants
For Blue participants, the Penalty Term is the sum of three
penalties:
 Penalty 1 ¼ 12 ðunitsAÞ2
 Penalty 2 ¼ 12 ðunitsBÞ2
 Penalty 3 ¼ 12 ðunitsCÞ2
where unitsA, unitsB, unitsC are your trading ‘‘exposure’’ in each
market. What is your trading exposure? It is just the total number
of units you bought (with a positive sign) or sold (with a negative
sign) in each market during the 220 s of trading. Consider for in-
stance market A. Suppose at the end of the round you have 70 units
of good A in the portfolio. Since you had an endowment of 50 units,
this means that overall you bought 20 units of good A. This is your
exposure in market A. Suppose instead you have 35 units in your
portfolio. This means that you have sold 15 units out of your
endowment. Your exposure in market A is then 15.
How to interpret the penalty terms? Consider Penalty_1. If uni-
tsA is equal to 0 (that is, your ﬁnal portfolio is equal to the original
endowment of 50) the penalty is zero, meaning you are not penal-
ized. If it is different from 0, then you will pay a penalty. Note that
the more your ﬁnal holdings of asset A is different from your origi-
nal endowment (50), the higher the penalty term. That is, your Pen-
alty_1 will be the greater the further away from zero your trading
exposure in market A. Note that since the Penalty_1 is squared it
does not matter whether you end up with a higher or a lower num-
ber of goods than the original endowment (that is, it does not mat-
ter whether unitsA is positive or negative). That is, you will pay the
same penalty if your ﬁnal holding of good A is 60 (unitsA = 10 units
since you end up with 10 units more than the original endowment
of 50) as if it is 40 (unitsA = 10 since you end up with 10 units be-
low the original endowment).
The same comments holds true forPenalty_2 and for Penalty_3.
That is, your Penalty_2 will be the greater the further away your
trading exposure in markets B is from zero; Penalty_3 will be the
greater the further away your trading exposure in markets C is
from zero.
Your penalty in each market will be shown to you on the screen,
soon after the trading activity in that market ends.
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20 units, inmarket B you sold 10 units and inmarket C you bought 5
units. Your Penalty Termwill be the sumof Penalty 1, 2 and3, that is:
 Penalty 1 ¼ 12 ðunitsAÞ2 ¼ 12 ð20Þ2 ¼ 200
 Penalty 2 ¼ 12 ðunitsBÞ2 ¼ 12 ð10Þ2 ¼ 50
 Penalty 3 ¼ 12 ðunitsCÞ2 ¼ 12 ð5Þ2 ¼ 12:5
Therefore, we will subtract 262.5 (Penalty_1 + Penalty_2 +
Penalty_3) from the earnings you got trading in the 3 markets A,
B and C.Example 2. You are a Blue participant and in market A you sold 35
units, in market B you sold 30 units and in market C you sold 20
units, then your Penalty Term will be the sum of:
 Penalty 1 ¼ 12 ðunitsAÞ2 ¼ 12 ð35Þ2 ¼ 612:5
 Penalty 2 ¼ 12 ðunitsBÞ2 ¼ 12 ð30Þ2 ¼ 450
 Penalty 3 ¼ 12 ðunitsCÞ2 ¼ 12 ð20Þ2 ¼ 200
Therefore, we will subtract 1262.5 (Penalty_1 + Penalty_2 +
Penalty_3) from the earnings you got trading in the 3 markets A,
B and C.
D.3.4. No per-round loss
To sum it all up, the per-round payoff is the sum of the trading
earnings in the three markets and Penalty Term
 EarningA + EarningB + EarningC  PenaltyTerm
where, however, the Penalty Term is computed differently accord-
ing to whether you are a Green or a Blue participant.
If in a round, the sum of the market earnings and the Penalty
Term is lower than zero (that is, you have made a loss and not a
proﬁt), then your per-round payoff will be set equal to zero. This
guarantees that, in each round, you never lose money.D.4. Payment
To determine your ﬁnal payment, we will sum up your per-
round payoffs for all the 10 rounds. We will then exchange this
sum into pounds at the exchange rate of 100 liras = £1 for Green
participants, and at the exchange rate of 200 liras = £1 for blue par-
ticipants. That is, if you are a Green participant, for every 100 liras
you have earned in the experiment you will get 1 GBP. If you are a
Blue participant, for every 200 liras you have earned in the exper-
iment you will get 1 GBP. The exchange rate have been chosen so
that on average Green and Blue participants can earn a similar
amount of money.
Moreover, both Green and Blue participants will receive a par-
ticipation fee of £5 just for showing up on time. We will pay you
in cash (in private) at the end of the experiment.
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